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I. Introduction
Proximate cause is a major, longstanding, and
well-established doctrine of tort law. The particular form of this
doctrine adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm provides that “[a]n actor’s liability
is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the
actor’s conduct tortious.” 1 The essence of the doctrine—as nicely
phrased by Warren Seavey, discussing Palsgraf v. Long Island
Rail Road Company 2—is that “[p]rima facie at least, the reasons
for creating liability should limit it.” 3 In England, Lord Hoffmann
wrote that “[n]ormally the law limits liability to those
consequences which are attributable to that which made the act
wrongful.” 4 For the Commonwealth, John Fleming wrote that
“[l]imitations on legal responsibility inevitably reflect a policy of
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
2. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
3. Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE
L.J. 390, 404 (1939). A classic judicial expression of this limitation is “to confine
the liability of a negligent actor to those harmful consequences which result from
the operation of the risk, or of a risk, the foreseeability of which rendered the
defendant’s conduct negligent.” Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir.
1955).
4. S. Austl. Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. York Montague Ltd. [1997] 3 AC 191 (HL)
213 (Eng.); see also W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 345 (18th
ed. 2010) [hereinafter ROGERS] (“Liability is generally limited to those
consequences . . . which are attributable to that which makes the act complained
of wrongful.”).
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keeping a rough correlation between what made the defendant’s
conduct culpable and what consequences he should be answerable
for.” 5 This doctrine has also been titled “harm-within-the-risk”
(HWR), which holds that liability is limited to harms materializing
from tortious risks for which the defendant is responsible. 6 For the
sake of accuracy, we refer to this doctrine as “HWTRS”—
harm-within-the-tortious-risk—standard.
When applied to the tort of negligence, the doctrine fits
comfortably into the two-stage structure of negligence law: the ex
ante stage (before harm occurs) and the ex post stage (after harm
has materialized). 7 In the ex ante stage, the court (jury) determines
whether the defendant’s conduct—at the time and in the
circumstances of its occurrence—was negligent, given its
foreseeable risks. 8 Where the social cost of the foreseeable and
unreasonable (tortious) risks on the negative scale exceeds the
foreseeable social value of the conduct on the positive scale, the
conduct is characterized as negligent. This is the essence of the
judicial “Hand Formula” now embodied in the Third Restatement. 9
In the second ex post stage, the HWTRS (proximate cause or scope
of liability, as the Third Restatement characterizes it) 10 steps in.
5.
6.

JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 232 (9th ed. 1998).
See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 334 (2002) (explaining the HWR label). “[HWR]
comes from this formulation of the negligence liability question: Was the harm
that happened to this plaintiff within the risk that made it negligent for the
defendant to have acted as it did?” Id. Hurd and Moore trace the origins of the
HWR analysis to Baron Pollock’s opinions from 1850 and to his grandson
Frederick’s hornbook, published in 1894. Id. at 339–40.
7. For the distinction between the two stages see, e.g., Ariel Porat, Ex-Post
Right, Ex-Ante Wrong, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2014) (arguing that
the law should impose liability for conduct that was negligent ex ante but became
non-negligent ex post).
8. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 363, 392 (1984) (“When a court is assessing whether there was a breach
of duty, the court assumes the eyes of a reasonable person in the injurer’s position
prior to the accident and tries to look into the future.”).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (defining “negligence” by comparing the costs of
reducing the risks involved with the magnitude and probability of the risks).
10. See id. § 29 cmt. a (“The difficulties arise in working out the framework
for this limit, both between no-duty limitations and scope-of-liability limits, and
in the form that scope-of-liability rules take.”).
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The court must not only verify that the alleged harm was in fact
caused by the negligent conduct, but also that this harm meets the
HWTRS—the harm materialized from foreseeable and
unreasonable (tortious) risk; that ex ante lay on the negative scale
that tipped the balance toward the finding that the conduct was
negligent. 11
The HWTRS can be easily justified in terms of corrective
justice as it connects the tortious aspect of the defendant’s (D)
conduct with the victim’s (V) actual harm. Indeed, Ernie Weinrib
argues that the HWTRS proves the correlative nature of tort law
such that “proximate cause connects the defendant’s negligence to
the plaintiff’s suffering of the kind of injury or accident the risk of
which rendered the defendant’s act wrongful.” 12 It is also
intuitively justified in terms of fairness. If, for example, a given act
is negligent because it creates a tortious risk of harm X to V1, and
the harm that actually materializes originates in non-tortious risk
Y to V2, finding D liable to V2 for Y seems unfair. As Judge
Cardozo characterized this fairness matter, one should sue for a
wrong that is personal to him “and not as the vicarious beneficiary
of a breach of duty to another.”13 The same principle applies to
cases where D’s conduct ex ante generates two risks of harm to V,
one tortious and one non-tortious, and ex post, it is the latter that
11. For the distinction between the ex ante stage and the ex post stage in tort
law, in general and especially in negligence, see Ariel Porat, Misalignments in
Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 90 (2011) [hereinafter Porat, Misalignments] (“There
are typically two stages to a court’s determination of liability in torts. In the first
stage the court decides whether the defendant behaved wrongfully . . . if the court
decides affirmatively, it proceeds to the second stage and decides on the amount
of damages to award.”); Mark F. Grady, Causation and Foreseeability, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 114, 115–18 (Jennifer H. Arlen
ed., 2013) (stressing that, while the proper breach-of-duty perspective is always
ex ante, the scope of liability perspective is ex post).
12. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Disintegration of Duty, in EXPLORING TORT LAW
143, 150 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). Because proximate cause is a requirement
of liability, Weinrib explains, “the defendant is not held legally responsible for the
materialization of a harm that is not within the set of possibilities that supply a
reason for exercising due care.” Id.
13. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). Although
Judge Cardozo did this as a matter of duty, Palsgraf is generally understood today
as addressing scope of liability rather than duty. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ET
AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 421 (10th ed. 2016) (placing Palsgraf in the
proximate cause chapter).
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materializes. The Third Restatement presents fairness as a major
rationale of the HWTRS.14 Unlimited liability, it is argued, creates
an unfair imbalance between the degree of wrongdoing and the
extent of responsibility, while the risk standard appeals to
intuitive notions of fairness and proportionality.15 “[T]here is a
penal aspect to imposing liability merely because of deficient
conduct.” 16
In this Article, we discuss the economic efficiency of the
HWTRS, namely, whether the exclusion of harms from the scope
of liability by the HWTRS is welfare-enhancing.17 As we limit our
discussion to the major aspect of efficiency in tort law—
deterrence 18—the general question addressed is whether the
deterrent effect of HWTRS is efficient or welfare-enhancing. To
properly tackle this question, we assess the different kinds of
harms that the HWTRS excludes from the scope of liability for
negligent conduct. 19 Following a thorough analysis of proximate
cause, we distinguish among the different categories of harms
according to the risks from which they ex ante originate and the
harms that ex post materialize. 20 The first category of harms
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing the rationale).
15. See id. (“Limiting liability to harm arising from the risks created by the
tortious conduct has the virtue of relative simplicity.”).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part III.D.4 (discussing findings from the illustrations).
18. We do not address the efficiency aspects of loss spreading and only
address the impact of administrative costs on efficiency briefly. See infra notes
48, 52, 154 and accompanying text (describing affirmative reasons for restricting
the scope of liability in certain models).
19. See infra Parts III, V (exploring seven different exclusions to HWTRS).
20. See infra Parts III, V (describing and analyzing each category
separately). Here we do not discuss rules of proximate causation that apply to the
extent of harm, such as the thin-skull rule that allows liability for unforeseeable
magnitude, or type of harm when resulting from the victim’s pre-existing
condition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 31 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that despite a plaintiff’s pre-existing
condition that results in unforeseeable extent or type of harm, nevertheless the
actor remains liable). As explained in the Third Restatement, rules that govern
the extent of harm can hardly be reconciled with the HWTRS because “other
policies are at work.” Id. § 29 cmt. p. Indeed, the thin-skull rule is a branch of the
direct-consequences doctrine of proximate cause. See Grady, supra note 11, at
139–45 (analyzing application of the “direct-consequences” doctrine in several
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excluded by the HWTRS, the category upon which we focus, is that
of “reasonable” risks of harm: risks that are socially desirable, such
as those that exist with beneficial drugs that contain inevitable
adverse effects. 21 The second category addresses risks of
“coincidental” harm, such as a falling tree that harms passenger V
in D’s car because the car happened to be at the location of the
falling tree due to D’s negligence in speeding. 22 The third category
is of “unforeseeable” risks of harm, 23 such as adverse effects of
different contexts). English Law demonstrates that this “directness” test is more
suitable for the question of liability for the extent of harm, while the appropriate
general test for proximate causation is the HWTRS. While in In re Polemis &
Furness, Withy & Co. [1921] 3 KB 560 (AC), the British Court of Appeal embraced
the directness test for determining the scope of liability, subsequently, the Privy
Council rejected that test in the general context of proximate causation and
actually embraced the HWTRS in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mort’s Dock
& Engineering Co., Ltd. (The “Wagon Mound” (No. 1)) [1961] AC 388. ROGERS,
supra note 4, at 334–38.
21. See infra Part III.D.3 (proffering medical treatment and driving as good
examples).
22. See infra Part V.A (describing coincidental harms as those whose risk of
occurring is unaffected by defendant’s negligence).
23. See infra Part V.B (stating the reason for excluding unforeseeable harms
in the Hand Formula). The distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable
risks by the HWTRS has been criticized on the grounds that the decision whether
a given risk is foreseeable depends on the level of generality at which the risk is
described. A risk that is considered foreseeable (and tortious), if described in a
general manner (road accident), may be considered unforeseeable (and
non-tortious) if described with particularity (exactly how, when, and why the road
accident occurred). “As a matter of argumentation, it always serves the defendant
to describe the risk as precisely as possible and the plaintiff to describe it as
abstractly as possible.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 468 (2000). Michael
Moore and Heidi Hurd refer to this problem as the “description problem.” See
Hurd & Moore, supra note 6, at 365 (“[F]or how one describes the risk(s) that
make the defendant’s conduct negligent does all the work to place the harm(s) in
question either within or outside of the stated risk(s).”). Arguing that neither
human psychology, nor morality, nor the law provides “a source of determinate
answers concerning how the risks generated by the defendant’s conduct ought to
be described,” the authors conclude that “the [HWTRS] test is entirely vacuous”
and “arbitrary.” Id. at 375–80. Although there is no fine-grained rule that
provides the precise degree of detail for a risk description, the authors go too far
in arguing that all risk descriptions are arbitrary. First, details that merely
describe the scenario but play no role in the risk should be omitted. Thus, it would
not matter what color the D’s eyes were or whether she wore a skirt or pants.
Second, with regard to excessive risk-related details—including that D was
driving 16.5 miles per hour over the speed limit and was on a cell-phone
conference call with her three boyfriends—courts regularly respond “with the
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drugs that cannot be discovered during premarketing testing. 24
Although unforeseeable risks are excluded at the ex ante stage,
when they materialize, the courts must address them at the ex post
stage when those unforeseeable risks concur with foreseeable risks
sufficient to make D’s conduct negligent. The fourth category is of
“unusual,” “abnormal,” or “freakish-like” risks, namely, risks with
low probability of materialization,25 such as fatally falling from a
treadmill. The next, fifth, category includes “usual,” “ordinary,” or
“background” risks that exist even in the absence of negligent
dictum that the manner of harm is irrelevant.” Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC, 107
A.3d 381, 391–92 (Conn. 2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); see also, e.g., Cay
v. La., Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 631 So. 2d 393, 399 (La. 1994) (“The fact that the
precise manner of harm (an intoxicated person’s staggering or being frightened
toward a bridge railing) may not have been anticipated does not break the claim
of causation.”); Ollison v. Weinberg Racing Ass’n, 688 P.2d 847, 851 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) (“[I]t is not necessary that the exact manner of harm should be foreseen;
the question is whether the harm is of the general kind to be anticipated from the
conduct.”). “Overriding, perhaps, is the guiding principle that the hazard should
not be defined with over particularity. . . . Nor should it be defined too broadly.”
FLEMING, supra note 5, at 243; see also Bradford v. Robinson Rentals Ltd. [1967]
1 All ER 267 at 269–70 (Eng.) (embracing the principle that to establish a
coherent chain of causation it is not necessary that the precise details leading up
to the accident be reasonably foreseeable; however, it is sufficient if the accident
that occurred is of a type that should have been foreseeable by a reasonably
careful person). Common sense does provide limits that Hurd and Moore ignore.
Clarence Morris explains that advocates’ efforts to describe a risk in either
too-general or too-specific terms are counter-productive because they are
apparent and lead the court to adopt the adversary’s characterization. CLARENCE
MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 163–67 (2d ed. 1980). Stephen
Perry, discussing “the coherence of foreseeability,” concludes—after considering
the “description problem” and reviewing the literature in this regard—that “there
is enough agreement, enough of the time, to make foreseeability a normatively
useful concept,” despite its indeterminacy. Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for
Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 101
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
24. Infra Part V.B; see also Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs,
Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 211 (1999) (exploring exceptions to the idea that drugs
cannot be designed differently). For a court denying liability for unforeseeable
risks, see Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 QB 518, W.L.R. 240, 1 ALL ER 98
(finding the risk of nudging an asbestos cover so it might fall into molten bath
and splash someone was foreseeable, but the risk that it would subsequently
explode was unforeseeable, which is what occurred).
25. Infra Part V.C.
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conduct, such as the road risks that are present even with careful
driving and the risks of medical complications that accompany
competently-performed surgery. 26 The sixth category is of risks of
harm that actually materialized only because of an “intervening
cause,” such as faulty or non-faulty conduct of another person or
forces of nature; such harms would not have materialized
otherwise. 27 Finally, the seventh category consists of “negligence
per se” cases, in which some harms are excluded from the scope of
liability on the grounds that the statute’s intent was limited to
protecting against different harms. 28 A statute requiring a
lifeguard at a pool to protect swimmers from drowning is not
intended to protect against the risk that a poolside sun bather will
suffer a stroke, which rendered her unable to summon emergency
aid. 29 As we shall see, 30 the different categories may sometimes
overlap with each other.
The economic-analysis literature has developed convincing
economic justification for the exclusion of both “coincidental” risks
of harm (second category) and “unforeseeable” risks of harm (third
category) from the scope of liability for negligent conduct, although
some doubts remain regarding the latter. 31 In contrast, the
prevailing view is that the exclusion of foreseeable but
“reasonable” risks of harm (first category) is, in principle,
inefficient where these risks are accompanied by other risks that
render the risk-generating conduct negligent. 32 Views are
amorphous and seem to differ regarding the efficiency of the
exclusion of the other four categories of risks from the scope of
liability (“low probability” risks; “usual/ordinary/background”
risks; “intervening” fault risks; and “negligence per se” risks). On

26. Infra Part V.D.
27. Infra Part V.E.
28. Infra Part V.F.
29. Infra Part V.F.
30. Infra Part V.E.
31. Infra Parts V.A and V.B.
32. See Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 126 (“Indeed if courts do set
the standard of care based on all foreseeable risks . . . then the wrongful risks
limitation should not apply . . . . But it seems that courts are often confused about
the application of the wrongful risks limitation . . . .”).
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the whole, it appears that the efficiency of the HWTRS has been
either denied or questioned.
On this background, our core and major argument is that a
major factor that bears on the efficiency of the exclusion of harms
by the HWTRS has so far been neglected. This factor is the
externalized expected benefits that negligent conduct generates.
Although economic analysis has acknowledged the importance of
this factor in other contexts of tort law, 33 it has failed to apply it to
the HWTRS. Our primary argument is that this factor provides
strong economic justification for the exclusion of “reasonable”
(although foreseeable) harms (the first category) from the scope of
liability by the HWTRS, challenging the prevailing view that the
exclusion of this category of harms from liability is inefficient. 34
After analyzing why and when exclusion of “reasonable” harms is
efficient in light of externalized expected benefits, we apply the
insights of this analysis—the externalized-benefits analysis—to
each of the other categories of harms to examine how it affects the
efficiency analysis of their exclusion. 35 We conclude that taking
account of this “missing factor”—externalized benefits—provides
significant support for the HWTRS, demonstrates its overall
positive economic balance, and helps to draw the efficiency lines of
this doctrine.
Externalized benefits are often, but not exclusively, present
when there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. For example, a doctor performing surgery may harm
the patient during the course of the surgery but may also provide
a benefit by resolving a medical issue. A drug may significantly
reduce a patient’s risk of heart disease while also causing adverse
side effects. Third-party benefits can of course occur as well; as for
example, when an experimental medical procedure harms the first
patient but provides insight that enables successful use for
others. 36
33. See infra notes 72 & 117 and accompanying text (considering
externalized benefits to offset externalized harms).
34. See Porat, supra note 11, at 123 (referring to the limitation as the
“wrongful risks limitation”).
35. See infra Part V (applying the externalized-benefits analysis).
36. For externalized benefits that render D’s act reasonable, see Parsons v.
Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1997) (finding no liability for a disposal

1526

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1517 (2017)

This Article proceeds as follows: Part II presents the basic
economic justification for the exclusion of harms from the scope of
liability for negligent conduct, focusing on the concepts of
internalization and excessive liability. 37 Part III explains why,
how, and when the “missing factor” of externalized expected
benefits renders the exclusion of “reasonable” risks from the scope
of liability by the HWTRS welfare enhancing despite a
“correlation” problem, which limits the ability to characterize risks
as “reasonable.”38 This analysis and the ensuing conclusion—that
exclusion of “reasonable” risks reduces the inefficiencies created by
excessive liability—are exemplified with three illustrations. 39 Part
IV responds to and critiques the claim made by Ariel Porat (joined
recently by Robert Cooter) that the exclusion by HWTRS of any
foreseeable risk considered by the court is inefficient (the
“misalignment” claim). 40 It also refutes a parallel claim made by
Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore that the exclusion by HWTRS of
any risk from the scope of liability makes no sense (the
Part
V
applies
the
“all-inclusiveness”
claim). 41
externalized-benefits analysis to the other six categories identified
above, showing for each of them how and when this
externalized-benefits analysis strengthens the economic rationale
for excluding from liability harm that materializes from these
risks. 42 Part VI concludes with some reflections on the adequacy,
or inadequacy, of the Hand Formula as a guide for efficient
internalization and thereby appropriate deterrence incentives. 43

company “operating socially beneficial machinery” when a company garbage
truck frightened a nearby horse, resulting in injury to the horse’s rider); Beatty
v. Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 12 N.W. 332, 334 (Iowa 1882) (noting that the risk involved
in constructing railroad tracks in proximity to a road is one that roadway
travelers must accept as the price for an improved method of transportation).
37. Infra Part II.
38. Infra Part III.B.
39. Infra Part III.
40. Infra Part IV.
41. Infra Part IV.
42. Infra Part V.
43. Infra Part VI.
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II. Why is it Efficient to Exclude Harms from the Scope of
Liability?
To understand why and when it is efficient under the HWTRS
to exclude from the scope of liability harms that were, in fact,
caused by the negligent conduct, one has to return to the roots of
the economic analysis of tort law—the Pigouvian/Coasian concept
of internalization of externalized harms.44 At the heart of the
internalization concept lies the idea that an actor, D,45 engaged in
an activity that created risks of harm to another, V, and tended to
disregard all or some of these risks when deciding on the extent of
the activity and the amount of care taken to engage in it. 46
Whenever such risks of harm to V (or Vs) are externalized, the
private cost of the activity to D is lower than its social cost, which
includes the risk to V (or Vs). 47 This gap inefficiently incentivizes
D to reduce her level of care, or increase the extent of the activity,
or both, leading to under-deterrence—the social cost of the harm
risked by D’s activity exceeds the social cost of its prevention. 48 The
role of tort law is to close this gap by forcing D to internalize
liability for the externalized risks of harm to any V. Faced with
higher costs of the activity (if the risk materializes and liability is
imposed), D is encouraged to adjust the level of care and the level
44. See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common
Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 583 (1987) (analyzing Pigouvian and Coasian theories).
45. “D” stands for an actual or would-be defendant.
46. See White, supra note 44, at 580–82 (using the example of a firm
polluting a river due to production that results in harm to a farm downstream).
47. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE pt. II, ch. IX (4th ed.
1932) (discussing “divergence between marginal social net product and marginal
private net product”); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 1 (1960) (“This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms
which have harmful effects on others . . . . [E]conomic analysis of such a situation
has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social
product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of
Pigou . . . .”). Cf. Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A
Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3
(2011) (seeking to refute Pigou’s and Coase’s arguments that a competitive,
private-ownership economic system that conforms to the neoclassical model fails
to allocate resources efficiently).
48. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26 (1970) (explaining that tort law should seek to minimize the sum of
the costs of accidents, accident prevention, and administrative expenses).
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of the activity to efficient levels. This is the essence of the theory
of efficient deterrence.
In principle, the burden that should be internalized to D is the
social cost she externalizes. When the burden internalized through
tort liability is lighter (partial internalization), some
under-deterrence will remain because the gap between social cost
and private cost is not completely closed. But what happens when
the internalized burden is heavier than the externalized social cost
(over-internalization)? Would that lead to over-deterrence in the
form of a care level that is too high and/or activity level which is
too low?
The traditional, simplified, economic models assumed that
over-internalization in the form of excessive tort liability would not
usually lead to over-deterrence under negligence law, which
considers only levels of care and not levels of activity. 49 Excessive
liability, it was reasoned, only strengthens D’s incentives to avoid
negligent conduct by adhering to the efficient level of care under
the Hand Formula.50 For example, if an externalized risk (PL) of
10 can be avoided by a precaution cost (B) of 9, excessive liability
of 20 or even 100, instead of 10, only strengthens D’s incentive to

49. According to traditional economic analysis, negligence law—as embodied
in the Hand Formula—seeks to incentivize D to adjust her level of care to the
efficient level, but not her level of activity. Only strict liability regulates this
aspect of D’s activity. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205
(9th ed. 2014) (“Rarely will a court in a negligence case try to determine the
optimal level of the activity that gave rise to the accident.”); STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21–32 (1987) (discussing levels of care and
levels of activity under negligence and under strict liability rules); Grady, supra
note 8, at 399 (stating that excessive liability will not result in excessive
precaution taking). But see Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the
Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320 (1992) (“[M]odern
American negligence law regulates activity levels to a considerably greater extent
than has previously been recognized.”). The exclusion of activity levels from the
Hand Formula is one of its shortcomings. See infra Part VI (questioning whether
the Hand Formula is the correct way to evaluate the efficiency of risk-creating
conduct).
50. See Grady, supra note 8, at 399 (“As a preliminary matter, note that the
effect of making a negligent dam owner liable for all harm that a widened spillway
would have prevented will not induce dam owners to widen their spillways. It will
induce them instead to find the precaution level that precludes liability least
expensively.”).
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invest 9 in precaution and avoid liability. 51 To justify the exclusion
of harms from the scope of liability, these models had to resort to
affirmative reasons for restricting the scope of liability. These
reasons include concerns that actors would be discouraged from
engaging in socially worthwhile activities, inter alia, because of
uncertainties and errors in the determination of negligence and
that failure to restrict the scope of liability would increase
administrative costs. 52
More realistic and contemporary economic models, however,
take into account imperfections in the negligence system such as
errors, insufficient information, inadvertence, and nonmeritorious
claims. 53 These models recognize that over-internalization through
excessive tort liability may lead to over-deterrence, not only in the
form of inefficiently reduced levels of activity, but also in the form
of inefficiently increased levels of care—too many or inadequate
precautions. 54
51. See SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 108 (“Were liability for negligence
unrestricted in scope optimal behavior would also result, since the threat of
liability would be wielded more often.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 236 (1987) (“[L]iability of
however broad a scope will have only one effect—to induce the defendant to take
due care . . . .”); Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 644, 651 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000)
Under the negligence rule an unrestricted scope of liability does not
necessarily deter the injurer from engaging in the activity. The injurer
is induced to take due care and thereby avoid liability and thus
becomes indifferent as to the actual scope of liability . . . . As long as
the exaggerated scope of liability does not boost the level of due care, it
has no adverse incentive effects per se.”
52. See SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 108–09 (“Then it would be socially
desirable for victims to bring suit, because that would serve to induce injurers to
reduce risk, and thereby also reduce the number of claims and administrative
costs.”). For saving administrative costs by excluding low probability harms, see
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 243.
53. For the transformation of the economic analysis of tort law from ideal,
simplified, and general models into more realistic, complex, and context-sensitive
models, see Jennifer H. Arlen, Introduction, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF TORTS 1 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013).
54. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 236 (finding that in the real
world of errors, excessive liability “will have misallocative effects.”); Ben-Shahar,
supra note 51, at 651–52 (“Inasmuch as the application of the negligence rule is
plagued with errors and uncertainties . . . the unrestricted scope of liability can
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The concern is that over-internalization due to excessive
liability would lead to over-deterrence that contributes to the
justification for the exclusion of harms from the scope of liability
by the HWTRS. This concern, however, applies only to harms that
would lead to excessive liability if included in the scope of liability.
Are the harms actually excluded by HWTRS such harms? Given
differences among the seven categories of risk of harm excluded by
the HWTRS, this question must be asked and answered with
regard to each category. We start with and focus on the first
category, “reasonable” but foreseeable risks of harm, because the
discussion of this category illustrates best the “missing factor” in
HWTRS analysis—externalized benefits—and highlights its
significance and importance. The externalized-benefits analysis is
later applied to the other six categories of harm to examine
whether and when their exclusion is justified by concerns of
excessive liability and over-deterrence.
III. The Exclusion of Foreseeable Reasonable Risks
To examine how excluding harms which materialize from
foreseeable reasonable risks from the scope of negligence liability
contributes to efficiency, we begin by characterizing “reasonable
risks,” 55 identifying a correlation problem that may sometimes
obstruct the ability to classify risks as reasonable or
unreasonable,56 and employing an economic analysis as to when
“reasonable” risks that materialize in harm should be excluded
from the scope of ex post liability due to concerns about excessive

have the crushing effect”); Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 119 ( “[I]n the
real world, with court and injurer risk of error . . . [w]hen the actual liability leads
to the expected liability exceeding the social risks, the injurer will take excessive
precautions.”); see also Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase
the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19,
22 (2000) (“Economists typically see no advantage in imposing liability beyond
the point that already internalizes social costs.”). Mark Grady argues that
excessive liability may induce D to substitute inefficient precautions for efficient
precautions. Grady, supra note 11, at 125–26.
55. Infra Part III.A.
56. Infra Part III.B.
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liability. 57 We then conclude with three illustrations illuminating
how the HWTRS promotes efficiency in this regard. 58
A. When is a Risk “Reasonable”?
A foreseeable risk of harm is “reasonable” if it generates
expected social benefits that equal or exceed its expected social
costs of harm. When the benefits associated with an act that
creates risk exceed its expected harms, the risk is not only
reasonable, but also socially desirable, as it enhances welfare.
Medical treatment and driving are good examples of
risk-generating activities that are nevertheless socially beneficial.
When D’s conduct generates only one risk and that risk is
reasonable, the conduct, by definition, is not negligent. In such
cases, we do not need to advert to the matter of ex post scope of
liability because liability is cut off at the ex ante stage. Though, it
is often the case that a given conduct generates a variety of risks:
risks to different parties 59 (including D 60); risks to different
interests (to bodily, property, and emotional tranquility, or to
economic interests, etc.); risks that differ in their probability given
the chain of events that leads to their materialization; and risks
that differ in their magnitude. Any given act may, therefore, create
both kinds of foreseeable risks—unreasonable and reasonable.
Using the terms of the Hand Formula, PLi denotes the
expected harms of a given risk i, and PBi denotes the expected

57. Infra Part III.C.
58. Infra Part III.D.
59. The risk of unfenced excavation filled with water may be reasonable to
boaters but unreasonable to divers. See Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 253
N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (addressing risk where a minor dove into a
water-filled strip mine area and broke his neck on the bottom).
60. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 54, at 19 (arguing that judges should
reconceptualize the Hand Rule so that risk to oneself increases the care owed to
others). See generally Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving a ship suing for damage incurred during a
storm at a particularly dangerous site in a city port where several other ships had
similarly suffered damage).
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benefits of risk i. 61 A given risk i is reasonable when PLi < PBi and
is unreasonable when PLi > PBi.
B. The “Correlation Problem”
Determining whether a risk is reasonable (with net positive
social value, i.e., PLi < PBi) or unreasonable (with net negative
social value, i.e., PLi > PBi) is not always possible due to a
correlation problem. The essence of this problem is that when a
single act generates multiple expected risks but only a single
benefit, there is no appropriate way to allocate that benefit among
the multiple risks; namely, there is no way to correlate a separate
benefit with each specific risk of harm to determine whether each
specific risk is reasonable or unreasonable. A major cause of this
difficulty is that, quite often, the only benefit of a given conduct is
its benefit to D in avoiding prevention costs—factor B in the Hand
Formula. This kind of benefit (on the positive scale) can often be
balanced only against all expected risks of harm (the negative
scale), as there is no logical or otherwise justified criterion to
allocate the unitary benefit among the conduct’s multiple risks to
distinguish between its reasonable and unreasonable risks.
To illustrate, assume that D, V’s employer, decides not to buy
safety equipment that costs 75 and protects each employee against
a risk of harm of 50. If there is only one employee, V1, there is no
correlation problem because the benefit of 75 of not buying the
equipment can be correlated only with the risk to V1. Obviously,
this risk is reasonable, having a positive net social value
(75 – 50 = 25), and D’s conduct is not negligent. Now, let us assume
that there are two employees, V1 and V2, each of them
independently subjected to a risk of 50. Here it is clear that D’s
decision not to buy the equipment is negligent as its net social
value turns out negative (75 – 50 – 50 = -25). But, in this case,
unlike the former, there is a correlation problem because there are
many ways to allocate the benefit of 75 (saved prevention cost)
between the two risks to V1 and V2. Correlating a benefit greater
than 50 to one risk would make the risk to one employee
61. In the “narrow” Hand Formula, B denotes the benefit of saving the
burden of precaution. In our extended Hand Formula, B denotes all benefits
associated with risk i.
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reasonable and the risk to the other unreasonable, and correlating
a benefit greater than 26 but less than 50 to any risk would make
risks to both employees unreasonable. In the absence of any
tenable ground to allocate to a given risk expected benefits greater
than its expected harm, the default rule in such cases should be to
characterize all risks as unreasonable.62 The same applies to
different kinds of risks to the same person.63
More generally, this correlation problem will arise whenever
the same conduct creates multiple risks and the conduct is
unreasonable only when those risks must be aggregated to
outweigh the benefits of the conduct, as in the illustration with V1,
V2, and D above.
Due to the correlation problem, it is not always possible at the
ex ante stage to perform the balancing of the social costs and
benefits of a given act in terms of risks—putting the reasonable
risks on the positive scale and the unreasonable risk on the
negative scale (risk balancing). To avoid this difficulty, courts
perform the balancing in terms of overall expected harms and
benefits: they aggregate all expected harms on the negative scale
and all expected benefits on the positive scale (aggregate
balancing) without associating harms with benefits in the
framework of reasonable/unreasonable risks. 64 This is what the
Hand Formula does, balancing all expected harms (∑PLi) against
all aggregate benefits (∑Bi) (aggregate balancing). However, where
courts can associate expected harms with benefits (comparing PLi
with Bi of each separate risk) and thereby differentiate among
62. See Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 124–27 (arguing that when
prevention costs are greater than any single risk, but less than the aggregate cost
of all risks, liability should be imposed for all risks).
63. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964)
We see no reason why an actor engaging in conduct which entails a
large risk of small damage and a small risk of other and greater
damage, of the same general sort, from the same forces, and to the
same class of persons, should be relieved of responsibility for the latter
simply because the chance of its occurrence, if viewed alone, may not
have been large enough to require the exercise of care.
64. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 591
(2002) (stating that judges advocating the Hand Formula instruct the jury on a
cost-benefit analysis).
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reasonable and unreasonable risks (risk balancing), they should,
from an efficiency perspective, prefer to do so. For example, failure
to add warnings and instructions in Chinese to a product may be
considered reasonable for Chinese English speakers, but
unreasonable for non-English Chinese speakers. Another example
is that failure to provide goggles to employees who repair,
maintain, and disassemble vehicles may be considered reasonable
with regard to employees with two good eyes, but unreasonable
with regard to employees with only one good eye.65 Indeed, when
evaluating the desirability of conduct that generates a variety of
risks—to different people, to different kinds of interests, and with
different degrees of probability and extent—we all tend to think in
terms of distinct risks, reasonable and unreasonable, and not in
terms of aggregate harms and aggregate benefits. 66 Moreover, even
if courts at the ex ante stage do aggregate balancing (Hand
Formula) rather than risk balancing,67 when they reach the ex post
stage and apply the HWTRS, they must still think and decide in
terms of distinct risks rather than in aggregate terms. After all,
the HWTRS excludes materialized risk (harm) from the scope of
liability. 68 In the above illustration, at the ex ante stage, a court
may add up the risks to all Chinese consumers and distinguish
between English speakers and non-speakers only at the ex post
stage.

65. See Paris v. Stepney Borough Council, [1951] A.C. 367 (H.L. 1950)
(involving a worker with one eye that was damaged during work and finding
negligence by the employer because of the greater consequences for the one-eyed
worker in losing vision in that eye).
66. For the argument that many judges oppose the aggregation of risks
across persons, see Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171 (2008).
67. See In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. [1921] 3 KB 560, 577 (AC) (“In
the present case [defendant] was negligent in discharging cargo to knock down
the planks of the temporary staging, for they might easily cause some damage
either to workmen, or cargo, or the ship.”). Beyond this kind of language, there
are several other methods to verify the fact that courts do take multiple risks into
account in determining breach of duty. See Grady, supra note 8, at 383 (explaining
that courts take multiple risks into account in determining negligence).
68. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (introducing the HWTRS
formula).
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C. The Efficiency of Excluding Reasonable Risks from the
Scope of Liability
Despite the correlation problem, frequently it is possible to
distinguish between expected reasonable risks (with positive net
social value of PLi < PBi) and expected unreasonable risks
(negative net social value of PLi > PBi), which courts are asked and
often do in the ex post stage. The question is whether and when the
exclusion of (foreseeable) reasonable risks from the scope of
liability under the HWTRS is efficient because it reduces excessive
liability and associated inefficiencies.
The answer is provided by the internalization concept. This
core concept, as we have seen, sanctions the internalization of
expected harms that D externalizes in order to close the gap
between social cost of the conduct and its lesser private cost to D. 69
The same logic dictates that where D’s conduct generates not only
expected harms, but also expected benefits, the benefits that are
externalized by D should also be internalized to her.70 Failure to
do so will create an opposite gap in which the private cost of the
conduct to D (who disregards these benefits) exceeds its true social
cost (which does account for these benefits). 71 Such a gap and the
resultant excessive liability will induce actors to reduce
inefficiently the level of activity or increase the level of care,
leading to excessive precautionary costs. Internalization of the
externalized benefits is required to eliminate or narrow this gap. 72
69. See supra Part II (“In principle, the burden that should be internalized
to D is the social cost she externalizes.”).
70. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for
Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 190 (2009).
When people promote their own interests, they often create negative
or positive effects for other people’s interests, without the latter’s
consent. Economists refer to these effects as “negative
externalities” . . . and “positive externalities” . . . . Ideally, from an
economic perspective, both the negative and positive effects should be
internalized by those who produce them, for with full internalization,
injurers and benefactors alike will behave efficiently.
71. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 180 (“Because the defendant
does not reap the full benefits of his act, neither should he have to pay the full
costs. Otherwise there will be too little of his activity.”).
72. That tort law should internalize not just externalized harms, but also
externalized benefits—by offsetting the latter against the former—has been long
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So how can tort law internalize externalized benefits? Tort law
is well equipped to internalize externalized risks of harms (by
imposing liability), but, unfortunately, much less equipped to
internalize externalized expected benefits. The legal tools that can
be used to that end are few and not well calibrated for the task. 73
recognized. At first, it was in the context of the rule that denies liability in
negligence for pure economic loss. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (arguing that the exclusionary rule can be
justified on efficiency grounds where and to the extent that V’s economic loss is
offset by economic gains to others who benefit from V’s loss, because V’s offset loss
is a private and not a social cost); Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in
the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 286–91 (1982) (same); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 51, at 251–55 (same); SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 135–40 (same). For
a discussion of externalized benefits in the broader context of tort law, see Israel
Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap between Private Loss and Social
Cost, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 590 (1997) (arguing that the failure of tort law
to internalize externalized benefits in an efficient manner casts doubt on the
overall efficiency of tort law and that the expansionist trend of tort liability is
therefore not necessarily compatible with the internalization theory). Ariel Porat
has argued that the positive effects of medical treatment should be offset against
its harms to avoid over-internalization which leads to over-deterrence in the form
of “defensive medicine.” See Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243,
265–66 (2007) (illustrating this concept with the example of child birth). Porat
further broadened the scope of the “benefits internalization” discussion by
applying it to the law of restitution; he suggested that for better internalization,
the law of restitution should, under specified conditions, require recipients to
compensate benefactors for unrequested benefits. See Porat, supra note 70, at 195
(“In contrast, when benefits are voluntarily conferred but not at the recipient’s
request, the law does not impose any duty of restitution on the recipient, and she
is allowed to keep the benefits at no cost to her. This rule, which this Article
advocates changing, has certain exceptions.”). Cooter recently joined Porat in this
regard. See ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT:
IMPROVING TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 149–64 (2014). The scope of the
“benefits internalization” discussion has been extended even further by
Dari-Mattiacci, who introduced different ways in which different branches of
law—not just tort and restitution but also intellectual property and public law—
can and do internalize externalized benefits. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci,
Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 49–55 (2009) (demonstrating first
through tort law and then with intellectual property and government
intervention); see also Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 43–44 (2006) (addressing
Pigouvian tax subsidies designed to internalize externalized social benefits). For
a recent discussion of the harms-benefits interrelations, see infra note 117.
73. One such potential major tool is the duty concept, which—theoretically
at least—enables courts to exclude from the scope of liability harms that are offset
by externalized benefits. A prominent example is the claim just discussed: the
exclusion of pure economic loss from the scope of negligence liability by the duty
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On this background, we argue that the exclusion of “reasonable”
risks from the scope of negligence liability by the HWTRS is an
important tool of tort law for internalizing externalized benefits in
order to reduce excessive liability and thereby promote efficiency.
The theory behind this argument is the following. Reasonable
risks are risks with a net positive social value: they are reasonable
because their expected benefits (PBi) exceed their expected costs
(PLi) or at least equal these costs. Obviously, the expected harms
of a reasonable risk should not be internalized to D (if externalized)
unless the benefits are also internalized (if externalized). Such
one-sided internalization would lead to excessive liability on D. If
the balance of risk X, for example, is expected benefits of 12
(PBx = 12), and expected harms of 8 (PLx = 8), and all harms and
benefits are externalized by D, the externalized net social value of
D’s activity is positive (12 – 8 = 4). Thus, it is this positive
externalized value, not cost, that should be internalized to D. D
should be credited for generating net social value of 4, rather than
concept can be explained because this loss is not a social cost that should be
internalized to D because it is offset by externalized benefits to other parties. See
supra note 72 and accompanying text (“At first, it was in the context of the rule
that denies liability in negligence for pure economic loss.”). But, as one of us has
argued, the way in which the exclusionary rule is actually applied by courts can
hardly be reconciled with its suggested economic rationale. The rule often fails to
internalize either externalized social benefits (thereby leading to
over-internalization of harms), or externalized social harms (leading to
under-deterrence). See Gilead, supra note 72, at 604–06 (“When the exclusionary
rule allows liability for direct losses that do not represent social costs, it
disregards the Gap and leads to over deterrence of injurers.”); see also Rizzo,
supra note 72, at 282 (arguing that in most cases of “pure economic loss,” the loss
constitutes true social cost). Another potential tool for offsetting externalized
benefits are rules of harm assessment and quantification that theoretically allow
reduction of damages awards by the amount of externalized benefits. Ariel Porat,
for example, has proposed to do so in the context of medical liability to prevent
“defensive medicine,” but he acknowledges that in practice, such offsetting does
not take place. See Porat, supra note 72, at 266–68 (illustrating with two different
precautions). Dari-Mattiacci argues that two additional ways in which tort law
internalizes externalized benefits include allowing benefactors to injure third
parties in the course of assisting gainers and punishing failure to produce a
positive externality in cases covered by liability for nonfeasance. See
Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 72, at 23, 49–53 (“[I]f the injurer were to completely
compensate the victim, he would actually be paying damages in excess of the
social loss. In turn, this would induce the injurer to take care beyond the socially
optimal level. There are two possible solutions to this conundrum.”).
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be “punished” by liability of 8, which would be excessive liability of
12. It should be borne in mind, though, that because D often does
internalize some expected harms74 and some expected benefits 75 of
her activity, 76 it is only the externalized (E) harms and benefits
that should be internalized. The relevant balance for
internalization is not ∑PLi compared with ∑PBi, but rather the
balance of ∑EPLi compared with ∑EPBi.77 In the above
illustration, assuming that EPBi is not 12, but only 9 (because D
already internalizes benefit of 3 which is prevention cost), the
positive net social balance would be 1, rather than 4, and the
imposition of liability of 8 on D would lead to excessive liability of
9, rather than of 12.
To sum up and generalize, by excluding foreseeable harms
that materialized from reasonable risks from the scope of ex post
liability, the HWTRS reduces the extent of excessive liability
otherwise caused by the failure of tort law to internalize the
expected externalized benefits that render these risks reasonable.
Excessive liability is reduced by the magnitude of the excluded
harms. This exclusion, in other words, offsets expected
externalized benefits and expected externalized harms against
each other and thereby reduces the scope of excessive liability to
the extent of this offset. As excessive liability may lead to
inefficient over-deterrence, its reduction or elimination by the
operation of the HWTRS is welfare-enhancing. We refer to this
generalized conclusion as the externalized-benefits analysis.

74. Such as harms to herself or harms to her reputation caused by the
infliction of harms on others.
75. Such as saved costs of prevention.
76. Possibly, D may internalize all the expected harms and benefits of her
activity.
77. If it is the externalized net difference between EPLi and EPBi that
should be internalized, why does the Hand Formula sanction the internalization
of PL instead of EPLi – EPBi? The answer, so it seems, is that under the Hand
Formula, it is assumed that all expected harms are externalized (E = 1), and that
all expected benefits are internalized (E = 0) because B stands for prevention costs
which D, by presumption, internalizes. For further discussion of the Hand
Formula and its shortcomings in this regard, see infra Part VI.
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For a better understanding of the externalized-benefits
analysis and its application and implications, we present three
illustrations that highlight different aspects of this analysis. 78
D. Illustrations
The first illustration of the HWTRS externalized-benefits
analysis is a well-known hypothetical case used in HWTRS
literature: the gun illustration. 79 The second illustration is taken
from case law: the pond illustration. 80 The third illustration
applies the externalized-benefits analysis to a more complex
multiparty situation where a variety of different benefits and costs
are involved: the drug illustration. 81 In each illustration, we
distinguish between a reasonable risk r and unreasonable risk u
that ex ante, being foreseeable, renders certain conduct negligent.
We then explain, by applying the externalized-benefits analysis,
how the ex post exclusion of the reasonable (and foreseeable) risk r
from the scope of liability by the HWTRS promotes efficiency by
reducing excessive liability. The different illustrations tackle the
different aspects of the externalized-benefits analysis as further
explained in the overview following the illustrations. 82
1. Loaded Gun and Injured Toe83
A hunter D hands over a loaded gun to a child P, who drops it
on her toe and breaks it. Handing over a loaded gun to a child
creates ex ante two foreseeable risks: a risk r that P will drop the
gun and injure herself or another person, and a risk u that the gun
78. Infra Part III.D.
79. Infra Part III.D.1.
80. Infra Part III.D.2.
81. Infra Part III.D.3.
82. Infra Part III.D.4.
83. This illustration is drawn from Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for
Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REV. 229, 231 (1932). The illustration
found its way into RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3 & rptrs note (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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will fire and injure someone.84 Assume that risk r (dropping) is
reasonable because D and P derive from the activity of handing
over objects to each other a benefit of 5 each, while the expected
harm of dropping the gun is only 5. The ex ante net balance of this
risk is positive Br > PLr (5 + 5 > 5). Risk r generates net social
welfare of 5 (10 – 5). Assume further that risk u (firing) is
unreasonable because expected harm (PLu) is 20 and it can be
prevented at a cost (Bu) of 3 (checking the gun before handing).
Risk u’s overall balance is negative: PLu > IBu (20 > 3). Overall, the
ex ante balance of D’s conduct is negative because ∑PLi (5 + 20
= 25) exceeds ∑Bi (5 + 5 + 3 = 13) (I = r,u) by 12. The conduct is ex
ante negligent.
At the ex post stage, in which the scope of liability is
determined by the HWTRS, the question is whether the exclusion
of the harm caused by materialization of risk r (dropping) is
efficient. According to the externalized-benefits analysis, the
answer is in the affirmative. D externalizes expected costs of 25
(20 firing + 5 dropping) and benefits of 5 (child's benefit). 85 Overall,
the externalized net social cost (∑EPLi – ∑EBi) is 20 (25 – 5).
Holding D liable only for the unreasonable risk u (20), but
excluding the reasonable risk r (5) from the scope of ex post liability
by the HWTRS, would achieve efficient and optimal
internalization and deterrence because the risk of liability given
the exclusion (20) would equal net externalized social cost (20).
Liability in this amount would incentivize actors who hand over
objects to children to monitor and reduce unreasonable dangers of
these objects (firing in this case 86), but it would not incentivize
them to refrain from handing over objects to children where the
associated risks are reasonable (dropping in this case). Failure to
exclude risk r from the scope of ex post liability would increase
expected liability to 25, namely, to excessive liability of
84. Note that in this illustration, there are two distinct aspects of D’s conduct
that could prevent risk: (1) not handing the gun to the child, which would prevent
both risks, and (2) unloading the gun before handing it to the child, which would
only prevent the risk of the gun being fired.
85. The other benefits of 5 (from handing over objects) and 3 (saved costs of
prevention) are internalized by D.
86. Obviously, D would prefer to invest 3 in preventing the firing risk rather
than take the liability risk of 20.
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5 (25 – 20).87 Such excessive liability could lead to inefficient
over-deterrence by incentivizing actors to refrain from the socially
desirable activity of handing over to children (or receiving from
them) objects, activity that involves only reasonable risks.
2. Landowner Fails to Warn Not to Swim in a Polluted Pond
A landowner fails to post a sign warning others not to swim in
a pond that has been polluted with bacteria that cause a fatal
disease. 88 This failure creates ex ante two foreseeable risks: a risk
r that a swimmer V will drown for reasons unrelated to the
pollution, and a risk u that V will contract the disease. Let us
assume that risk r (drowning) is reasonable because the benefits to
V (pleasure of swimming) are 9 while the expected danger of
drowning is only 5. The ex ante net balance of this risk is
positive: Br > PLr (9 > 5). Risk r generates social welfare of 4.
Assume further that risk u (disease) is unreasonable because
expected harm is 35 and it can be prevented at a cost of 3 (posting
a sign). Risk u’s overall balance is negative: PLu > Bu (35 > 3).
Overall, the ex ante balance of D’s conduct is negative because ∑PLi
(5 + 35) exceeds ∑Bi (9 + 3) (I = r,u) by 28. The conduct is ex ante
negligent.
At the ex post stage, in which the scope of liability is
determined by the HWTRS, the question is whether the exclusion
of the harm caused by materialization of risk r (drowning) is
efficient. According to the externalized-benefits analysis the
answer is in the affirmative. D externalizes expected costs of 40
(5 of drowning + 35 of disease) and benefits of 9 (swimming).
Overall, the externalized net social cost (∑EPLi – ∑EBi) is 31 (40 –
9). Holding D liable only for the unreasonable risk u (35), but
excluding the reasonable risk r (5) from the scope of ex post liability
by the HWTRS, would not affect efficient internalization and
deterrence because the extent of liability despite the exclusion (35)
would exceed the net externalized social cost (31). Such expected
burden would incentivize actors who control access to polluted
87. Twenty is the externalized net social cost and 25 is the expected liability.
88. This illustration is based on Darby v. Nat’l Tr., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 189
(Eng.). The court ruled that the plaintiff’s decedent’s death was outside the
defendant’s scope of liability.
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swimming water to warn against unreasonable risks associated
with swimming in these waters. On the other hand, the exclusion
of liability for harm due to risk r would promote efficiency by
reducing the incentives of those who control access to swimming
water to forbid reasonable swimming in nonpolluted water. Note
that unlike the former gun illustration—where the exclusion of
risk r by the HWTRS eliminated any excessive liability and
equalized expected liability with the net externalized social cost—
in this illustration, some excessive liability (of 4 (35 – 31)) would
remain even after the exclusion of risk r by the HWTRS. Yet, the
exclusion of risk r, as mentioned, reduces the size of excessive
liability and thereby mitigates its related inefficiencies. Failure to
exclude risk r from the scope of ex post liability would increase
expected liability to 40, namely, to excessive liability of 9 (40 – 31) 89
rather than of 4, more than doubling excessive liability.
3. A Cholesterol-Reducing Drug
A cholesterol-reducing drug is used by 1,000 consumers. The
market price is 5, and the average production cost is 2 (total cost
of production = 2,000). Each consumer enjoys a reduction of
cholesterol level that is valued, on average, at 12.90 The same
causal process that reduces cholesterol also causes a minor liver
problem with a cost of 4; all consumers are made aware of this
associated problem, although there is no way to avoid or mitigate
this risk other than ceasing to take the drug.
In addition to the liver problem, the drug creates a risk of a
more serious heart problem—about which the consumers are
unaware91—due to a different causal process, with a cost of 80% to
10% of users, here 100 users. The only available precaution is to
cease selling the drug, as there is no way to identify which patients
will suffer heart problems in advance, nor is there any way to
mitigate the adverse effect once it occurs.

89. The externalized net social cost is 31 and the expected liability is 40.
90. The range of the value to different consumers lies between 15 and 9 along
a downward sloping demand curve.
91. We assume that the producer either knows or at least has reasonably
foreseeable knowledge of the heart risk.
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The risks (PLi) that the drug generates can be classified by
courts in two ways. One classification is according to the two sets
of affected consumers: risk to the 900 consumers who are exposed
only to the risk of liver harm (group A) and risks to the group of
100 consumers who are exposed to the risk of heart problems as
well (group B). The alternative classification is based on the
expected kind of harm and the causal process: risk of liver harms
and risk of heart harms.
Starting with the classification of risks according to groups,
the risk to group A, risk r, is clearly reasonable. The overall
benefits (∑Br) are 10,800 (900 X 12) and the overall harms (∑PLr)
are 3600 (900 X 4). The positive social balance is 7,200 and after
deducting production costs of 1,800 (900 X 2), the net positive social
benefit is 5,400.92 Group A and each of its members are
beneficiaries of the product. 93 In contrast, the risks to group B, risk
u, are clearly unreasonable. The risks to group B (∑PLu),
comprising the 100 consumers who are ex ante exposed to both
risks, are 8,400 (100 X 80 + 100 X 4) and the overall social cost,
which includes production costs of 200 (100 X 2) is 8,600. The
benefits (∑Bu) are 1,200 (12 X 100), so that the overall social value
is negative—cost of 7,400 (8,600 – 1,200). Looking at the overall
social balance
of the drug,
given its two
risks
((∑PLi – ∑Bi)( I = r,u)), the outcome is negative—a social cost of
2,000 (7,400 – 5,400).94 The production of the drug is negligent.
At the ex post stage, in which the scope of liability is
determined by the HWTRS, the question is whether the exclusion
from liability of the harm caused by materialization of risk r (group
92. Some of which the manufacturer internalizes, i.e., revenue of 5 less the
cost of production of 2 equals 3 for each of the 900 units for a total of 2,700. The
remainder, 2,700, is consumer surplus.
93. On a personal level, each member faces a market price of 5 and a risk of
4, but an average gain of 12. Ultimately, this means an average personal gain of
3.
94. Again, 7,400 is the net negative value of the risk to group B (combined
harms of 8,400 minus benefits of 1,200 plus production costs of 200). The net
positive social value to group A is 5,400 (benefits of 10,800 minus harms of 3,600
minus production costs of 1,800). This negative balance of the overall social value
of the drug (2,000) can also be reached simply by deducting the overall benefits of
reduced cholesterol (12,000) from overall costs of harms (4,000 + 8,000 = 12,000)
and costs of production (2,000) (12,000 – 14,000 = -2,000).
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A) is efficient. According to the externalized-benefits analysis, the
answer is in the affirmative. On the costs side, D externalizes all
the health risks to both groups, which are 12,000
(3,600 group A + 8,400 group B). 95 On the benefits side, D
internalizes only the sale revenues of 5,000 (5 X 1,000), and
externalizes the remaining 7,000 of the product’s 12,000 benefits
(12 X 1,000). Overall, the net balance of externalities that should
be internalized to D is 5,000 (∑EPLi – ∑EBi = 12,000 – 7,000 =5,000).
Efficiency requires that D’s liability should be set at 5,000: the
optimal ex ante expected burden. 96 If liability is ex post imposed for
both risks, its burden (12,000) would exceed the optimal burden by
7,000 (12,000 – 5,000). Exclusion of risk r to group A from the scope
of liability (3,600) by the HWTRS would reduce the burden of
liability to 8,400 and reduce excessive liability to 3,400. Failure to
exclude risk r from the scope of ex post liability would increase
expected liability to 12,000, namely, to excessive liability of 7,000
rather than of 3,400 (12,000 – 5,000), more than doubling excessive
liability. In sum, the exclusion of liability for the materialization
of risk r by the HWTRS from the scope of liability enhances
efficiency by reducing, although not eliminating, excessive liability
and consequent concerns that drug producers will refrain from
producing more helpful than harmful drugs with reasonable side
effects.
The externalized-benefits analysis is similar, and the
efficiency of the HWTRS is even greater if risks are classified not
according to groups A and B but according to the different causal
chains that lead to the different kinds of expected harms. Under
this classification, risk r is the causal chain that causes liver
problems while reducing cholesterol to all the 1,000 consumers.
Risk r is reasonable, having a net social value of 8,000
(∑Br – ∑PLr = 12,000 – 4,000), and after deduction of all production
costs (2,000) a net social value of 6,000. Risk u, the causal chain
that causes heart problems, is clearly unreasonable as its expected
95. Production costs (2,000) are internalized by D.
96. Risk of liability of 5,000 will incentivize D to stop producing the drug
given that D’s net gain from production is only 3,000 minus revenues of 5,000
(1,000 X 5) and production costs of 2,000 (1,000 X 2). Arguably, liability of 3,000
would suffice to incentivize D efficiently to cease production but only liability of
5,000 will fully internalize to D the full externalized cost of the activity.
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costs (∑PLu) are 8,000 and it has no benefits (∑Bu = 0). The overall
social balance of the drug (∑PLi – ∑Bi) is, again, a negative social
cost of 2,000 (8,000 – 6,000) and, therefore, the production of the
drug is negligent. Here as well, despite D’s negligent conduct, the
externalized-benefits analysis shows that the exclusion of risk r
from the scope of D’s liability by the HWTRS is efficient. As the
optimal burden on D is 5,000 (∑EPLi – ∑EBi), 97 if liability is
imposed for both risks, its burden (12,000) would exceed the
optimal burden by 7,000 (12,000 – 5,000). Exclusion of the
reasonable risk r from the scope of liability (PLr = 4,000) would
reduce the burden of liability to 8,000 (12,000 – 4,000) and reduce
excessive liability from 7,000 to 3,000 (compared to a smaller
reduction to 3,400 under the former risk classification).
4. An Overview of the Illustrations
The above illustrations reveal that:
(1) Expected-benefit analysis can contribute to efficient
deterrence when the benefits produced by an actor engaging in
risky conduct do not accrue solely to the actor, i.e., benefits are, at
least in part, externalized.
(2) Despite the “correlation problem,”98 specific risks and
specific benefits of a given conduct can often be associated with
each other in order to distinguish between reasonable risks and
unreasonable risks (dropping versus firing; drowning versus
disease). Sometimes the different risks are to the same people
(child; swimmer) and sometimes to different people (group A and
group B). There are various ways to classify risk (by groups of
people versus causal chains).
(3) Reasonable risks, by definition, are risks of harm that are
correlated with benefits that exceed or at least equal the expected
harms. These expected benefits, if externalized, should be
internalized alongside the internalization of externalized harms to
avoid excessive liability.
97. As under the classification by groups, the balance is 12,000 – 7,000 =
5,000.
98. See supra Part III.B (“The essence of this problem is that when a single
act generates multiple expected risks but only a single benefit, there is no
appropriate way to allocate that benefit among the multiple risks . . . .”).
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(4) By excluding from the scope of liability harms that ex post
materialized from an ex ante reasonable risk, the HWTRS actually
internalizes the externalized benefits of this risk to the extent that
these benefits offset the externalized harms.
(5) The exclusion of reasonable risks from the scope of liability
by HWTRS does not undermine incentives to avoid negligent
conduct (checking a gun before handing it over; warning against
swimming in a polluted pond; ceasing production of a drug that is
more harmful than helpful).
(6) The internalization of externalized benefits through the
exclusion of reasonable risks of harm from the scope of liability by
HWTRS reduces or avoids excessive liability.
(7) Reduction or avoidance of excessive liability may well be
welfare-enhancing, as it mitigates or prevents over-deterrence
through excessive liability on socially desirable activity (handing
objects to children; allowing others to swim in one’s pond;
producing drugs that are more helpful than harmful).
(8) The exclusion of reasonable risks from the scope of liability
by the HWTRS may lead to optimal liability, but only where it
offsets and avoids any excessive liability (the gun illustration).
Otherwise, it only reduces excessive liability (the pond and the
drug illustrations).
IV. Responding to the Critique of HWTRS for Excluding
Foreseeable Harms
The conclusion that the HWTRS promotes efficiency by
reducing excessive liability via the ex post exclusion of foreseeable
harms that materialized from ex ante reasonable risks challenges
a prevailing view that the exclusion of foreseeable risks of harm
from the scope of liability in negligence, unlike the exclusion of
coincidental risks or unforeseeable risks, is in principle inefficient.
Grady, for example, takes it for granted that the efficient rule for
the paradigm of harm resulting from reasonably foreseeable risks
should be liability rather than exclusion. 99

99.

Grady, supra note 11, at 136.

POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES

1547

A major attack on the HWTRS for excluding harm resulting
from foreseeable risks from the scope of liability has been launched
by Porat, 100 now joined by Cooter,101 who argues that such
exclusion is inefficient because it may result in under-deterrence.
Porat and Cooter argue that to avoid this inefficiency, all
foreseeable risks considered by the court at the ex ante stage
should generate liability at the ex post stage if materialized in
harm.102 This argument corresponds with the argument previously
made by Hurd and Moore that the distinction under the HWTRS
between those foreseeable risks that should generate liability and
those that should not, makes no sense.103 Applying the
externalized-benefits analysis, the following sections explain why
Porat and Cooter’s attack on the exclusion of foreseeable harms
from the scope of liability by the HWTRS is misconceived from an
efficiency perspective, and why Hurd and Moore are incorrect in
claiming that such exclusion makes no sense.
A. The “Alignment Principle” and Porat’s/Cooter’s
Criticism of the HWTRS
In a 2012 Yale Law Journal article, Porat argues that tort law
is (and should be) governed by a principle that he titles “the
alignment principle.” 104 This principle is presented as one of tort
law’s fundamental principles and as a major criterion for
understanding and evaluating tort doctrines, rules, and the
100. Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11.
101. Cooter & Porat, supra note 54.
102. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 54, at 20–21 (“To be specific, courts should
interpret the injurer’s burden of care in the Hand Rule as ‘net burden.’ By net
burden we mean the injurer’s cost of care minus the resulting reduction in the
injurer’s risk.”).
103. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 6, at 364–65
[O]nce one appreciates that all risks created by a defendant weigh in
an assessment of his negligence, it would appear that any and all
harms that materialize from the defendant’s conduct are within the
category of risks that make such conduct negligent. If this is true, then
of course the test fails as a test of anything; for it fails to provide any
means of distinguishing harms for which the defendant ought not to be
held responsible from harms for which he ought to be liable.
104. Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 84.
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functioning of courts. The essence of the alignment principle is that
when a court determines that certain conduct is negligent because
of the foreseeable risks of harm that it creates ex ante, liability ex
post should be imposed for all the harms materializing from these
foreseeable risks that were considered at the ex ante stage. 105
Doing so is an alignment—ex post liability is aligned with the ex
ante setting of the standard of care. Failing to do so is a
misalignment. 106 Porat further argues that misalignments should
be suspected of being inefficient in terms of deterrence, and,
therefore, require convincing justifications either on efficiency
grounds or on grounds of corrective justice. 107
Porat identifies the Third Restatement’s HWTRS as an
unjustified misalignment that creates inefficient incentives. 108
Following a claim made in a previous 2009 Article, 109 and later
reiterated in a book coauthored with Robert Cooter, 110 Porat
argues in his 2012 Yale Article that, when a court considers a
foreseeable risk of harm at the ex ante stage in which D’s act is
evaluated for negligence, the risk, if materialized in harm, should
be internalized to D at the ex post stage.111 The ex post exclusion of
such foreseeable harm from the scope of liability by the HWTRS is,
according to Porat, an unjustified misalignment that leads to
105. Id.
106. In Porat’s words, “In negligence law, the risks taken into account by
courts when setting the standard of care are the same risks considered when
imposing liability and awarding damages. I call this the ‘alignment principle.’”
Id.
107. See id. at 87 (“It argues that from both efficiency and corrective justice
perspectives, the misalignment cannot be justified.”).
108. See id. at 123–24 (identifying the Third Restatement’s HWTRS rule as
“the wrongful risk limitation,” and arguing that “the wrongful risks limitation, or
at least the way it is often applied by courts, is yet another manifestation of
misalignment”).
109. See Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 979 (2009) (“The normative argument this Article makes is
that the weight given to the limiting liability conditions should be dramatically
decreased.”).
110. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 47–60 (arguing that all
foreseeable risks should be taken into account ex post when determining the scope
of liability).
111. See Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 123–24 (examining the
wrongful risk limitation).
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inefficient under-deterrence. In Porat’s words, “[m]y argument is
twofold: (a) absent special policy considerations, all foreseeable
risks created by the injurer should be and are considered by courts
when they set the standard of care; (b) therefore, exempting the
negligent injurer from liability for harms materializing from
foreseeable risks creates misalignment.” 112
Although Porat does not explicitly mention “reasonable risks”
as the foreseeable risks that the HWTRS (the wrongful risk
limitation) inefficiently excludes from the scope of liability, he
obviously includes the exclusion of these risks in his criticism of
the HWTRS. He refers to “non-tortious,” 113 “ordinary,” and “usual”
risks as risks that by their exclusion from the HWTRS create a
misalignment; 114 thus encompassing what one might understand
as reasonable risks. Moreover, Porat reiterates that all harms
materializing from foreseeable risks should not be excluded at the
ex post stage if considered at the ex ante stage, and that such
exclusions can be justified, if at all, only by policy considerations
under the “duty” concept.115
True, Porat’s (now also Cooter’s) criticism of HWTRS may
appeal to intuitive perceptions. If D’s conduct is ex ante negligent
because its overall foreseeable balance is negative (although some
risks are reasonable) and if ex post, the reasonable risk that
resulted in materialized harm could have been avoided if D was
not negligent, should not D pay for the materialized harm? But as
we have seen, the externalized-benefits analysis undermines this
misleading intuition. A risk is reasonable because its expected
benefits exceed its expected harms and, therefore, one-sided
internalization—only of the externalized harms but not of the
externalized benefits—leads to excessive liability and
112. Id. at 124.
113. COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 53.
114. See Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 125 (“In light of this
analysis, a misalignment arises.”).
115. See Porat, supra note 109, at 991 (“Limiting liability for policy
considerations, however, is completely unrelated to the argument that risks that
do not define the injurer as negligent should not result in liability.”); see also
COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 58 (“In the absence of policy considerations
that exclude liability, liability should be imposed for all foreseeable harms that
materialize from risks increased by the injurer’s negligence.”).
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over-deterrence rather than under-deterrence as argued by Porat
and Cooter.116
Porat’s omission to account for the need to internalize not just
externalized harms, but also externalized benefits when
evaluating the efficiency of HWTRS is puzzling. After all, Porat is
a leading scholar calling for internalization of externalized
benefits, 117 albeit in contexts other than the HWTRS.
Unfortunately, it appears that Porat’s omission to extend his own
externalized-benefits analysis to the HWTRS led him to
unjustified criticism of the latter. 118
An example used by Porat and Cooter to illustrate the
inefficiency of HWTRS in excluding foreseeable risks 119
demonstrates its efficiency once externalized benefits are taken
into account rather than mistakenly disregarded:
A doctor delivered a baby vaginally, even though the large size
of the baby warranted a C-section. A knot of the umbilical cord
caused the baby’s death. Prior to delivery, nothing indicated
unusual risk relating to the umbilical cord . . . . In this case, a
C-section would have saved the baby’s life. The parents bring a
wrongful death action against the doctor for her negligent
failure to deliver by C-section. Should she be held liable? 120
116. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (explaining
over-deterrence).
117. Supra note 72. Moreover, Porat’s recent work focuses on the
interrelations between benefits and harms. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ariel Porat,
Harm-Benefit Interactions, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 86, 87 (2014) (discussing cases
in which harms to victims are accompanied by a benefit to the injurer); Ariel Porat
& Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, 100 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2014) (discussing
offsetting benefits in two-party and three-party tort cases and proposing
guidelines as to when these benefits should be offset against harms and when
they should not).
118. Porat and Posner, in their detailed analysis of offsetting benefits, assume
that benefits can be offset against harms to avoid excessive liability only by:
(a) reducing damages; (b) granting a right to restitution to D; or (c) adjusting the
standard of care. See Porat & Posner, supra note 117, at 1202, 1208 (illustrating
through the example of a driver rushing a passenger having a heart attack to the
hospital and injuring a pedestrian along the way). They fail to recognize that the
HWTRS provides another powerful and often-used measure of offsetting benefits
in both two-party and three-party cases: excluding reasonable harms from the
scope of negligence liability.
119. COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 63–64; Porat, supra note 109, at 986.
120. COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 63.
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Porat and Cooter predict that under the HWTRS, liability for the
death would be denied because this risk is “unusual” or a
“background” risk, and they argue that this would lead to
Assuming
that
the
inefficient
under-deterrence. 121
usual/foreground risk (the baby’s large size) is 60, all other
unusual/background risks (including the umbilical cord) are 30,
and that the cost of a C-section is 80, Porat and Cooter conclude
that liability should be imposed not just for the foreseeable usual
risk (60) but also for all unusual risks (30), including death by
umbilical cord. 122 Liability restricted to the foreground/unusual
risk of 60, they argue, would not suffice to incentivize D to invest
80 to perform a C-section, thus leading to under-deterrence. 123 The
problem in this analysis, however, is that it disregards the
externalized benefits to the mother, child, and others of natural
delivery rather than a C-section. If these benefits, for example, are
15, then the net social value of a C-section ∑PLi – ∑PBi is not a
positive 10 (60 + 30 – 80) as Porat and Cooter argue, but rather a
negative 5 (60 + 30 – 80 – 15). Therefore, a C-section, being
inefficient (∑PLi < ∑PBi 90 < 95), should not be performed. The
inclusion of the unusual/background risks in the scope of liability,
as suggested by Porat and Cooter, would lead to over-deterrence:
inefficient C-sections. The exclusion of these risks from the scope
of liability by the HWTRS would avoid this over-deterrence. 124
121. Id.
122. Id. at 64.
123. Id.
124. It should be noted that the above example deviates in two major aspects
from the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision upon which it is based, in which the
court dismissed the suit for lack of proximate cause. CA 2717/02 Plonit v. Bnei
Zion Med. Ctr. Haifa 58(1) PD 516 [2003] (Isr.). First, the court held that the
umbilical cord risk was an unforeseeable risk, not a foreseeable background risk,
as categorized in Porat and Cooter’s example. Id. Porat and Cooter agree that
unforeseeable risks should be excluded from the scope of liability. COOTER &
PORAT, supra note 72, at 14. Second, the court assumed that the foreground risk
(fetus-size-related risk) was sufficient to justify the C-section, while in Porat and
Cooter’s example, the foreground risk was insufficient to justify a C-section—only
the combined effect of all risks justified a C-section. Adjusting the numbers to the
facts of the real case means that the costs of the C-section were lower than the
foreground risk (60); namely, not 80 but, for example, 50. Given these numbers,
it is evident that the exclusion by the HWTRS of all the background risks,
including the umbilical cord death risk, even if these risks were foreseeable, is
efficient. Internalization of only the foreground risk of 60 is sufficient to
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The same kind of analysis shows that in all of the above
illustrations—loaded gun, polluted pond, and cholesterol-reducing
drug—Porat and Cooter’s disregarding externalized benefits would
lead to inefficient excessive liability. 125
B. Is the HWTRS “All-Inclusive”? Hurd and Moore’s Critical
Conception of the HWTRS
Porat and Cooter’s alignment argument—that in principle, all
foreseeable risks considered by the court at the ex ante stage
should generate liability if ex post they materialize—aligns with
an argument previously made by Hurd and Moore. The essence of
this argument is that because the ex ante stage combines all
expected harms, thereby tipping the scale toward finding the
conduct negligent, all foreseeable harms should be considered
tortious under HWTRS and none can be excluded at the ex post
stage.126 In their words, “[b]ut if all harms, discounted by their
probability, are to be included in the calculus of risk, then it would
appear that any harm that happens as the result of a defendant’s
unjustified conduct is within the risks that make the defendant’s
conduct unjustified.” 127 This outcome is termed by the authors as
the inherent “all-inclusiveness” of the HWTRS.128
The difference between Porat/Cooter on the one hand, and
Hurd/Moore on the other hand, is that the former argue that the
HWTRS should be all-inclusive and criticize it for not being so,
while the latter argue that the HWTRS is all-inclusive and criticize
it for being so. 129 According to Hurd and Moore, the alleged
incentivize D to perform the C-section (60 > 50). Non-exclusion of this risk, as
suggested by Cooter and Porat, leads to excessive liability of 90 (instead of 60),
which may incentivize physicians to perform inefficient C-sections as a practice
of “defensive medicine,” criticized by Porat. Id. at 51.
125. Porat has expressed a contrary view, “I see no reason why . . . liability
should not be imposed on the hunter in the Restatement example.” Porat,
Misalignments, supra note 11, at 126 n.127.
126. Hurd & Moore, supra note 6, at 365.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Compare COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 51, with Hurd & Moore,
supra note 6, at 365.
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“all-inclusiveness” of the HWTRS is a major problem because it
leads to the outcome that “all defendants are responsible for all
harms that they cause to all persons,” which is absurd in their
view.130 Yet, despite their contrasting views regarding what the
HWTRS is and what it should be, they all make the same
mistakes—disregarding benefits that render some risks
reasonable. Descriptively, the HWTRS is not all-inclusive, as
argued by Hurd and Moore, because expected harms that can be
correlated with expected benefits in the framework of reasonable
risks are actually excluded from the scope of liability by the
HWTRS. Normatively, the HWTRS should not be all-inclusive
because reasonable risks should be excluded by the HWTRS to
promote efficiency.
V. Applying the Externalized-Benefits Analysis to the Other Six
Categories Excluded by the HWTRS
Our major argument to this point, that the missing factor of
the HWTRS analysis—recognition of externalized benefits—not
only provides a solid economic justification for the exclusion of
foreseeable reasonable risks from the scope of liability, but also has
broader
implications.
We
argue
that
applying
the
externalized-benefits analysis to the other six categories of cases
excluded by the HWTRS from the scope of ex post liability supports
the economic rationale behind the exclusion of risks addressed in
the other categories. We briefly draw the general outlines as to
when and how it does so, hoping that further research in this
direction will shed more light on the economic rationale of these
categories.
A. Coincidental Harms
Some harms caused by negligent acts are considered
“coincidental.” 131 These are harms that would have been avoided
130. Hurd & Moore, supra note 6, at 365.
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 30 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“When tortious conduct does not generally
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but for the D’s act, but the negligent act did not increase the risk
of the harm occurring. 132 The seminal case is Berry v. Sugar Notch
Borough. 133 A tree that the municipality allegedly should have
removed fell on a trolley and injured the motorman while he was
negligently speeding. 134 The accident would have been avoided
were the motorman driving carefully (more slowly) because he
would not have reached the tree at the time and place of its fall. 135
Yet, the only causal effect of the negligent speeding was to put the
trolley at the place and time that the tree fell. 136 Viewed ex ante,
the negligent speeding did not increase the probability that a tree
would fall on the trolley because this risk is coincidental and
unrelated to the speed of the trolley. Actually, ex ante, the chances
that the negligent speeding would, in fact, cause such harm are
equal to the chances that negligent speeding would in fact avoid
such harm. 137 The court held that the negligent speeding was not
a proximate cause of the harm, therefore the plaintiff’s negligence
did not bar his claim. 138
As external risks unrelated to D’s negligent conduct,
coincidental risks are not, and should not be, considered as the
basis for negligence liability.139 That explains why the HWTRS, in
accord with its inner logic, excludes them from the scope of liability
for negligent conduct, even though this conduct was a but-for cause
increase the risk of the type of harm that occurred, the wrongful aspect of the
actor’s conduct is merely serendipitous or coincidental in causing the harm.”).
132. See id. (“The critical inquiry is whether the risks posed by the tortious
conduct of the actor, would, if repeated, make it more likely that harm such as
that suffered by the other person would also occur.”).
133. Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899).
134. Id. at 240.
135. See id. (explaining the defense’s argument that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent because the plaintiff would not have been struck by the
tree if he had been driving at a slower speed).
136. Id.
137. Had the motorman driven carefully, it was equally likely that a tree
would have fallen on the trolley at another place or time. See id. (“The same thing
might as readily have happened to a car running slowly, or it might have been
that a high speed alone would have carried him beyond the tree to a place of
safety.”).
138. Id.
139. Nor for a determination of contributory or comparative negligence.
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of their materialization. The Third Restatement provides that “[a]n
actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s
conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of
that harm.”140
From an economic perspective, risks of coincidental harms,
because of their nature, do not increase the ex ante probability that
negligent conduct of D would cause such harm.141 Being unrelated
to D’s negligent conduct, these risks should not be internalized to
D. Ex post imposition of liability on D for such conduct-unrelated
harm will have no efficient deterrent effect on D’s incentives to
avoid harms because increased care would not reduce the
probability of the coincidental risk’s materialization. 142 Such
liability would be excessive and lead to over-deterrence. 143
Accordingly, exclusion of coincidental risks of harm from the scope
of liability is efficient because non-exclusion leads to excessive
liability. 144
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 30 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
141. See id. (“When tortious conduct does not generally increase the risk of
the type of harm that occurred, the wrongful aspect of the actor’s conduct is
merely serendipitous or coincidental in causing the harm.”).
142. See SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 113 (stating that the socially optimal level
of care is reached by excluding coincidental harms from D’s duty of care).
143. “[R]estriction of scope tends to prevent injurers from bearing more than
the increment in expected accident losses that their activities create and thus
forestalls the problem that injurers would be discouraged from engaging in
socially worthwhile activities.” SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 113.
144. The above analysis, it should be noted, also applies to and explains the
economic logic of the preliminary requirement of factual causation, namely, the
requirement that the harm sued for would not have occurred but for the negligent
conduct. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 236
To hold a defendant liable for the consequences of an accident that
would have occurred even if he had not been negligent (in the economic
sense) will yield no allocative gains because, by assumption, liability
will not deter a similar accident in the future . . . . There is also the
danger that if the defendant is liable for accidents that he cannot
prevent, he will use excessive care.
See also SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 108 (imposing liability for harms that would
have occurred anyway may lead to over-deterrence). Along the same lines, Cooter
and Porat conclude that “[l]iability should be restricted to wrongdoing that
increased the probability of the injuring occurring.” COOTER & PORAT, supra note
72, at 55. “Generally a causal link between an activity and an injury would be
required. It would clearly be unproductive to try to induce a modification in
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The externalized-benefits analysis provides additional
support for the exclusion of coincidental risks: the externalized
risk that a coincidental harm may occur if the conduct is negligent
is offset by the externalized benefit of avoiding a similar
coincidental harm by a non-negligent conduct. The risk and the
benefit offset each other. In Berry, for example, the ex ante
externalized risk that a tree may fall on car if its driver negligently
speeds is offset by the ex ante externalized benefit of avoiding the
fall of another tree on the car at another place or time were the
driver driving at or below the speed limit. 145
B. Unforeseeable Harms 146
Being a regime of fault-based liability, the law of negligence,
at the ex ante stage of applying the Hand Formula on D’s conduct,
takes into account only reasonably foreseeable risks of harm. 147
Unforeseeable risks are not included in the PL side of the Hand
Formula equation.148 The reason is simple: failure to avoid risks
that one could not and should not have foreseen 149 involves no fault
and, therefore, D’s conduct should not be deemed negligent
because of such risks at the ex ante stage (although other
conduct for the purpose of reducing injury costs unless we believed the conduct to
be causally linked to those injury costs.” Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84 (1975).
Calabresi explains that, although the but-for requirement is not a “categorical
imperative,” it is “a sound way of determining, on a case-by-case basis, what
burden-incentive should be placed on the loss bearer.” Id. at 85, 87.
145. Assuming that the chance of a tree falling on a moving vehicle is the
same whether that vehicle is driving slowly or speeding.
146. For a “description problem” in distinguishing between foreseeable and
unforeseeable risks, and the scope of this problem, see supra note 23.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that two of the primary factors that courts
consider when determining the standard of reasonable care are the foreseeable
likelihood that harm would result and the foreseeable severity of the harm).
148. See id. § 3 cmt. g (“To establish the actor’s negligence, it is not enough
that there be a likelihood of harm; the likelihood must be foreseeable to the actor
at the time of conduct.”).
149. Risks that are not foreseeable, even if all measures for reasonably
required research were taken.
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foreseeable risks may nevertheless be the basis for ex ante
negligence). As the creation of unforeseeable risks is not
considered tortious, the HWTRS excludes such risks from the
scope of liability.
The economic rationale behind this exclusion is that ex post
liability for unforeseeable risks of harm would not promote
efficient deterrence. 150 If a given risk is ex ante unforeseeable, D
would not be able to avoid or reduce that risk because D is unaware
of the risk. 151 So inclusion of unforeseeable risks in the scope of
liability would lead to excessive liability and, thus, exclusion of
liability for unforeseen risks contributes to efficiency.
The above economic rationale for exclusion is questionable on
the grounds that while Ds are unaware of specific unforeseeable
risks that their conduct generates, they are often aware that some
unforeseeable risks may materialize into harms and, therefore,
will take additional precautions to avoid liability for such harms.
The counter argument is that taking such additional precautions
against unforeseeable risks is “a shot in the dark” that can hardly
be efficient. 152 Liability that encourages such speculative attempts
to reduce unknown risks can hardly be effective and may well be
excessive. 153
150. For a concise review of the literature in this regard (by Calabresi,
Shavell, Posner, Landes, and Grady), see Ben-Shahar, supra note 51, at 661–62.
Cooter and Porat, who criticize the HWTRS for excluding foreseeable risks, stress
that “[w]e do not suggest abandoning foreseeability as a precondition for liability,
a requirement with valid justifications.” COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 58;
see supra Part IV.A (noting Cooter and Porat’s criticism).
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Foreseeability often relates to practical
considerations concerning the actor’s ability to anticipate future events or to
understand dangerous conditions that already exist.”).
152. See Grady, supra note 11 (“The purpose of the reasonable-foresight
doctrine of proximate cause is to avoid the administrative costs of imposing
liability for harms that would impose larger cost on injurers to foresee than the
social benefit that would follow from liability.”).
153. An additional economic justification for the exclusion of unforeseeable
harms from the scope of liability has been proposed by Mark Grady. Grady argues
that inclusion of unforeseeable harms (as well as coincidental, low probability,
and intervening-fault harms) in the scope of ex post liability may be inefficient so
that their exclusion promotes efficiency. Id. at 133. The reason, Grady explains,
is that in the real world, courts impose negligence liability for risks that are
created inadvertently even where such inadvertence is efficient. Id. at 129. This
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The externalized-benefits analysis provides, in our view,
another economic justification for the exclusion of unforeseeable
risks from liability. To the extent that nonspecific prospects of
unforeseeable harms should be taken into account, the same
applies to nonspecific prospects that some unforeseeable benefits
may materialize. A drug, for example, may not just have
unforeseeable side effects that are detrimental, but also
unforeseeable beneficial effects. Arguably, these contradicting
prospects may offset each other, and, given the uncertainty, it may
well be better that all unforeseeable outcomes are disregarded. As
with reasonable risks, one-sided internalization of unforeseeable
harms without the corresponding internalization of unforeseeable
benefits would lead to excessive, potentially inefficient liability.
The need for reciprocity in this regard has roots in considerations
of fairness as well. Once “the rules of the game” are changed and
D is discredited for unforeseeable harms, fairness requires that D
should be credited for unforeseeable benefits. 154
C. Low-Probability Risk: “Unusual,” “Abnormal,” or
“Freakish” Risks
The basic economic rationale for the exclusion of “unusual,”
“abnormal,” or “freakish” risks from the scope of liability by the
HWTRS is closely related to the corresponding rationale for the
over-internalization leads to excessive liability that may lead to over-deterrence.
The exclusion of harms by the HWTRS, Grady argues, restricts the scope of
liability and thereby avoids or reduces excessive liability. Whether or not
negligence law indeed imposes a kind of strict liability for harms caused by
efficient inadvertence is questionable. But, even if this is the case, Grady’s
rationale justifies exclusion only of harms caused by efficient inadvertence. He,
therefore, must establish that harms actually excluded by HWTRS—
unforeseeable, coincidental, law-probability, etc.—are harms typically caused by
efficient inadvertence. We are not convinced that this has been sufficiently
established. It stands to reason that in many situations of inadvertence (such as
driving or medical treatment), the risks are quite foreseeable. Robert Cooter &
Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 329, 329 (2014).
154. For an analysis of denying liability for risks unknown and not reasonably
knowable to the actor on grounds of fairness and administrative cost, see OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94–96 (1881).
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exclusion of coincidental and unforeseeable risks of harm. The low
probability of the unusual, abnormal, or freakish may minimize or
nullify the deterrent effect of liability for such risks or be
outweighed by the additional costs of litigation. 155
Here, as well, externalized-benefits analysis provides an
additional supporting rationale. To the extent that externalized
low-probability risks of harm are associated with externalized
low-probability benefits that render the risks reasonable, or
otherwise offset the expected harms of low-probability risks, the
latter should be excluded from the scope of liability.
D. Foreseeable, “Usual,” “Ordinary,” or “Background” Risks
Ariel Porat’s 156 criticism of the exclusion by the HWTRS of
foreseeable risks of harms focuses on the exclusion of foreseeable
risks that are “usual,” “ordinary,” or “background” risks from the
scope of liability. 157 Porat claims, based on his “alignment”
principle, that because these kinds of risks should be considered in
the ex ante stage, at which D’s conduct is evaluated as being
negligent, they should not be excluded by HWTRS at the ex post
stage of imposing liability for materialized risks considered at the
ex ante stage. 158 Their exclusion from the scope of liability, Porat
claims, is a “misalignment” that leads to inefficient
under-deterrence. 159
Discussing Porat’s claims in the context of reasonable risks,
we show above that to the extent that these kinds of usual,
ordinary, or background risks are reasonable—namely, associated
with benefits that offset the risks of harm—Porat’s criticism is
misconceived because he fails to take into account externalized
benefits. 160 Once these benefits are considered, there is a strong
economic case for their exclusion by the HWTRS.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 109; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 243.
COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 47–60.
Supra Part IV.A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Assuming, however, that sometimes these usual, ordinary, or
background risks are unreasonable (associated harms exceed
associated benefits), we agree with Porat that these risks should
not as a rule be excluded from the scope of liability if otherwise
externalized by D. Such exclusion would usually lead to
inadequate liability to deter socially harmful conduct. Yet, as with
unforeseeable risks, 161 an exception to the rule should be
recognized in cases in which D’s conduct generates not just
externalized usual, ordinary, or background risks of harm, but also
externalized usual, ordinary, or background expected benefits. If
the former are offset by the latter, exclusion of the former from the
scope of liability is justified on economic grounds.
E. Intervening Factors: Faulty or Non-Faulty Conduct of Another
Person or Forces of Nature
Sometimes D’s negligent conduct would not have caused P’s
harm but for the operation of an intervening factor: the fault of
another person (intentional, reckless, or simply negligent); the
nonfaulty conduct of another person; or a force of nature. The
Third Restatement has no special provisions for such intervening
factors and rightly so. It applies HWTRS to intervening factors by
providing that “[w]hen a force of nature or an independent act is
also a factual cause of harm, an actor’s liability is limited to those
harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct
tortious.” 162
What are the economic justifications for excluding harms that
materialize through intervening factors from the scope of D’s
liability for her negligent conduct? Such justifications exist
wherever the intervening factor renders the risk of harm
coincidental, unforeseeable, reasonable, or of low probability. The
economic justifications for the exclusion of these kinds of risks,
reinforced by the externalized-benefits analysis, are discussed
above. However, when the intervening factor does not render the
risks created by D’s negligent act unforeseeable, unreasonable, or
161. Supra Part V.B.
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 34 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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of low probability, liability for harms materializing from
intervening factors may well be justified.
F. Negligence Per Se
Under the negligence per se doctrine, breach of a statutory
duty may generate tort liability for harm factually caused by the
breach. Yet, as provided by the Third Restatement, liability is
limited only to the type of accidents and class of persons that are
within the statute’s designed scope of protection. 163 This limitation
on the scope of liability parallels the common law’s HWTRS. It may
be understood as a doctrine requiring Harm Within the
Statutorily-defined Risk (HWSR). In practice, absent explicit
statement in the statute regarding the excluded risks, it is the
courts that interpret the statute and decide which risks to exclude.
In these cases, HWSR gets very close to HWTRS and even merges
with it. Thus, the above analysis of HWTRS is applicable to HWSR.
Whether the legislature or the courts exclude from the scope of
liability risks of coincidental harms, unforeseeable harms,
reasonable risks, or other (externalized) risks that are
counterbalanced by (externalized) benefits, such exclusion may
well be efficient according to the externalized-benefits analysis.
Porat has argued that courts tend inefficiently to exclude risks
from the scope of negligence per se risks that are considered to be
usual, ordinary, or background risks. 164 The evidence provided to
support this descriptive statement is quite thin—Porat165 provides
one case to support his claim. 166 But, even if Porat is descriptively
correct, our earlier analysis about the exclusion of usual, ordinary,
or background risks by the HWTRS being economically justified by
externalized benefit applies to HWSR as well. 167 In any case, to the
extent that inefficient exclusion of usual, ordinary, and
163. Id. § 14.
164. Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 89.
165. Id. at 124 n.122.
166. See generally Carman v. Dunaway Timber Co., 949 S.W.2d 569 (Ky.
1997) (involving a log striking a logger as he attempted to unchain the load at the
mill).
167. Supra Part V.D.

1562

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1517 (2017)

background risk does take place under HWSR, it does not follow
that the same happens under HWTRS. The scope of liability for
common law claims is broader than for negligence per se claims.
Anderson v. Turton Development, Inc., 168 another case addressed
by Porat,169 reveals precisely this point. 170 In that case, although
the court decided the plaintiff could not rely on negligence per se
based on scope of liability limitations, the appellate court reversed
the summary judgment granted to defendant so that the plaintiff
could pursue her common law negligence claim. 171 The Third
Restatement explains precisely the same principle, revealing the
inappropriateness of comparing negligence per se with common
law negligence limitations on the scope of liability.172
168. 483 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
169. Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 124 n.122.
170. See Anderson, 483 S.E.2d at 598–99 (involving a hotel patron suffering
an injury on a hotel ramp).
171. Id. at 600. For other cases similar to Anderson, permitting a party to
pursue a common law negligence claim despite denying the use of negligence per
se because of its more stringent restrictions on scope of liability, see Freeman v.
United States, 509 F.2d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that even though the
regulation in question—prohibiting parachutists from parachuting into clouds—
was designed to protect the parachutists-plaintiffs and, therefore, would not
support contributory negligence per se, plaintiffs could still be found
contributorily negligent under common law standards); Thoma v. Kettler Bros.,
632 A.2d 725, 728 (D.C. 1993) (finding that prospective townhouse purchasers
were not entitled to per se negligence instruction because they did not come
within class of persons intended to be protected by Occupational Safety and
Health Administration regulations violated by defendant, but that evidence of
such violations was admissible to determine defendant’s negligence); and
Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Co., 695 P.2d 897, 899 (Or. 1985) (holding that while
violations of occupational safety rules did not establish negligence per se for
injured nonemployee plaintiff, such violation may be considered with regard to
the issue of due care by defendant).
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[I]f a statute designed to prevent falls by
persons with disabilities requires elaborate railings on the side of stairways, and
if a person who is able-bodied is then injured in a fall . . . , this fall can be seen as
not the type of accident the statute is considering.”). For example, a worksite may
contain a plainly dangerous condition that proves the employer’s violation of an
occupational safety regulation; even so, under this section, negligence per se
cannot be invoked if the person suffering injury on account of that dangerous
condition turns out to be not a worker but rather a business invitee on the
employer’s premises. However, in such a case—and in many of the cases involving
a victim who is not in the proper class—the discrepancy between the harm that
happens and the harm the regulation has sought to prevent is narrow.
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VI. Conclusion and Some Reflections on the Hand Formula
The core of economic analysis of tort law explains tort liability
as a method to internalize to Ds the social cost of harms that their
conduct inflicts upon Vs, social cost that is otherwise externalized.
But risk-generating conduct often generates not just risks of harm
but also benefits, actual and expected, other than the saving of
prevention costs. When these benefits are externalized, they
should also be internalized. While tort law is well equipped to
internalize externalized costs of harm, it is not equipped to
internalize externalized benefits, i.e., require victims or third
parties to pay Ds for the benefits they received from Ds’ conduct.
Although the economic literature has recently been much more
attentive to this major aspect of tort law’s efficiency, it has
neglected to account for it in the context of proximate cause—the
operation of HWTRS. This unfortunate disregard of externalized
benefits has led to unjustified criticism of HWTRS. Integration of
the missing factor of externalized benefits into the economic
analysis of HWTRS reveals that this form of the proximate cause
doctrine can and does serve as a major benefit internalizer that
contributes significantly, although not necessarily sufficiently, to
the efficiency of tort law by reducing excessive liability. 173
The integration of externalized benefits into the efficiency
analysis of HWTRS has led us to reconsider a related aspect of this
analysis—the extent to which the Hand Formula: a) accounts for
benefits when ex ante evaluating D’s conduct, b) should be applied
or otherwise taken into account at the ex post stage where the scope
of liability is determined.
As to the benefits of a risk-generating activity, the question is
which benefits are actually taken into account by the Hand
Formula at the ex ante stage when deciding whether PL exceeded
B. Obviously, the benefit to D of saving the costs of precautions is
Accordingly, even if negligence per se is properly not applied in these cases, the
actor’s violation of the regulation may be admissible as evidence of negligence.
173. This conclusion substantiates the intuition that “[i]f it would be
inefficient to provide tort damages for a class of injuries, courts can exculpate the
defendant from liability under the element of proximate cause.” Mark A.
Geistfeld, Fault Lines in the Economic Analysis of Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 158 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013).
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embodied in factor B, but what about the other benefits that D
derives from her given level of activity? These benefits appear to
be absent from the Hand Formula. Indeed, Cooter and Porat have
argued that one kind of such benefits, the reduction of the self risk
to which D is exposed, is absent from the Hand Formula and
should be integrated into it 174 as the Third Restatement
recognizes. 175 Another question is whether and how the Hand
Formula embodies the benefits that other persons, third parties,
derive from D’s risk-generating activity. Are these benefits
deducted from the PL component, added to B, or simply
disregarded? According to Posner and Landes the answer seems to
be that these benefits are disregarded. While describing “optimal
or due care,” Posner and Landes assume that “everyone else’s
utility is independent of” the litigating parties’ utility. 176 Moreover,
Posner excludes from the Hand Formula benefits (and costs) that
D derives from the given level of activity when compared to
alternative higher or lower levels of activity.177 Given the absence
of each of these three kinds of benefits (D’s, third parties’,
level-of-activity-related benefits) from the Hand Formula, one may
wonder whether this formula is indeed the right way to evaluate,
ex ante, the efficiency of risk-generating conduct.
Another question raised by the externalized-benefits analysis
is the role of the Hand Formula at the ex post stage, when the scope
of liability is determined. While at the ex ante stage the court
determines whether D’s conduct was negligent given its expected
harms and benefits, at the ex post stage, the court has to decide on
the scope of liability that should internalize to D the net social cost
that D externalizes. What should be internalized is not PL, but
rather ∑EPLi – ∑EBi, as exemplified by all of the above
174. COOTER & PORAT, supra note 72, at 32–46; Cooter & Porat, supra note 54,
at 24; Porat, Misalignments, supra note 11, at 129–33.
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
176. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 59.
177. Supra note 49. In this regard, Posner acknowledges that “[j]udicial
inability to determine optimal activity levels except in simple cases is potentially
a serious shortcoming of a negligence system.” POSNER, supra note 49, at 176.
Shavell, as well, refers to the exclusion of levels of activity from the determination
of due care as “the defect of the negligence rule.” SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 25.
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illustrations. Yet, it seems that there is common understanding
that at the ex post stage the court should internalize PL.178 Porat’s
alignment principle, for example, is based on this kind of
alignment between the two stages.179 But, the internalization of
PL, rather than ∑EPLi – ∑EBi, is clearly mistaken from the
internalization perspective. It is defensible only where
PL = ∑EPLi – ∑EBi. That may be the case where the only benefit
is of saving precautions and this benefit is fully internalized by D
(so that ∑EBi = 0), and PL equals ∑EPLi as all risks of harms are
externalized. Yet, it appears that in many cases, PL does not equal
∑EPLi – ∑EBi, and internalization of PL may lead to either
over-deterrence or to under-deterrence.
The conclusion emerging from our analysis is that negligence
liability should ex post internalize not the expected loss (PL) but
rather the expected difference between externalized costs and
benefits (∑EPLi – ∑EBi). This conclusion may be conceived, we
recognize, as revolutionary because it questions and seems to
undermine the basics of the traditional economic analysis of tort
law. Yet, this conclusion fits well into the major argument made,
as early as 1960, by Ronald Coase in his seminal Article, The
Problem of Social Cost. 180 In his 1988 book, Coase clarifies the
main purpose of his 1960 Article was to criticize internalization of
externalities that is “equal to the damage caused,” as opposed to
the externalized social cost that has to be internalized. 181 Adapted
to the Hand Formula, and taking into account externalized
benefits, Coase’s criticism surely applies to the internalization of
PL rather than the internalization of ∑EPLi – ∑EBi. 182
The above reflections on the implications of the
externalized-benefits analysis on the ex ante and ex post efficiency
of the Hand Formula are preliminary and call for further and
deeper scrutiny. Yet, they do suggest that externalized-benefits
analysis should play a greater role in the economic analysis of tort
178. Actual liability equals L and not PL, but in terms of ex post deterrence,
liability for L equals ex ante deterrence of PL.
179. Supra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.
180. Coase, supra note 47.
181. RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 184 (1988).
182. For questioning the efficiency of the Hand Formula as “an internalizer,”
see Gilead, supra note 72, at 600–03.
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law than it does today. We hope that in applying this analysis to
the HWTRS, we contribute to such a change.

